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The European Union is the product of a unique institutional process: individual states, often with 
a history of belligerent relationships, have gradually given up ever more sovereignty to produce 
an increasing number of common goods, including the Single Market, a joint currency and 
common policies. In the process, the Union has integrated increasingly diverse countries and 
achieved institutional progress beyond its borders. These achievements are particularly 
remarkable given that member states have had and still have widely different views of the 
desirable speed and ultimate depth of integration. Possibly the single most powerful force 
sustaining the process of integration has been the implicit, and often explicit, threat by more 
committed member states to form an inner core, a “club-in-the-club”. Conversely, less 
enthusiastic members have supported extending membership to more countries as a strategy to 
frustrate deeper integration.  
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We build a simple theory to analyze how “deepening” and “widening” interact.1 Members have 
different costs in contributing to a common good, a “reform”. Decisions require unanimity so that 
the level of reform is determined by the highest-cost (or “weakest”) member. To push through 
more deepening, “stronger” members can threaten to form an inner club. A two-class Union 
involves costs for all members, but benefits only the members of the inner club. Weaker members 
may hence spend more effort on reforms, in order to prevent the threat from being executed. We 
show that widening can have different effects on deepening. When a new member is stronger 
than the weakest incumbent member, deepening and widening are complements, and the effort of 
the Union increases. When the new member is weaker, though, they can be substitutes and the 
effort of the Union may fall. 
The above results hold when the threat of forming a club-in-the-club remains off equilibrium, as 
has been the case in the EU until now. We apply our analysis to the history of the treaties 
governing the European Union. We show that its key elements can be understood as outcomes of 
a delicate balancing act between maintaining the pressure to pursue further integration 
(deepening) and enlarging the Union to more member states (widening). We demonstrate the 
differences between the enlargement to stronger countries such as Austria, Finland and Sweden, 
and the Eastern Enlargement which more than any previous enlargement increased heterogeneity.  
We finally expand the logic of our theory in two directions, first, to rationalize the general move 
from unanimity voting to different types of majority; second, to explore the possibility that a 
club-in-the-club may actually form and its implications for further EU reforms. 
                                                 
1 Closely related is the literature comparing club participation of heterogeneous agents in the 
presence of e.g. externalities (e.g. Bordignon and Brusco, 2001; Dixit, 2003; Harstad, 2006; 
Hausken et al., 2007). 
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 I.  A Model of Reform under Unanimity 
We consider the European Union as an organization with  member states, who produce a 
common good. To develop our arguments we analyse a simplified version of the model by 
Berglof et al. (2007). In particular, all members choose simultaneously an effort level e  without 
first agreeing by vote on how much effort (common good) to provide. The consumption benefit 
of each member is determined by the smallest effort in the organization, scaled by the size of the 
organization: . The Leontief production technology captures in a simple 
manner the notion that under unanimity some members can hold back the entire organization.  
N
1 2min[ , ,.., ]NN e e e
All members receive the same utility from consuming the common good, but differ in their cost 
of effort. Member state i  has effort cost , and the parameter (type) N∈ 2 / 2ieθ iθ  is equidistantly 
distributed on the support [ , ]θ θ . Assigning rank 1 to the most productive or strongest type θ , the 
cost parameter of the member with rank  is  i
(1)       ( )11i iNθ θ θ θ−= + −−  
The Leontief technology implies that member i 's payoff is 
(2)       21( , ) min{ ,.., } / 2i i N i iy e N e e eθ θ= −
As the members have different costs, their preferred amount of public good differs. We abstract 
with intent from transfer payments as a means to influence members’ effort choices. Instead, we 
show how the threat of a club-in-the-club can coerce weaker members to exert more effort.  
Since the effort of the members states are complements, our simultaneous move game has a 
continuum of Nash equilibrium outcomes (Legros and Matthews, 1993; Vislie, 1994). Denoting 
by  the minimum effort level exerted by all members except i , member i  chooses effort to e%
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maximize  
(3)      .  2min{ , } / 2i i iN e e eθ−%
Thus, member 's optimal choice is i /i ie N θ=  if / ie N θ≥% , and ie e= %
e
 otherwise, since any effort 
 would be wasted. Whenever the constraint 0ie e− >% / iN θ < %  binds for some type i , it also 
binds for all less productive types 
k=
1,..i k N= + . Consequently, the effort level /N θ at which the 
payoff of the weakest type θ  reaches its unconstrained optimum determines the maximum effort 
level that can be sustained in equilibrium. In addition, any effort level [0, / )e N θ=  can also be 
supported as a Nash equilibrium because no individual member has a unilateral incentive to 
change the effort level. We will use the Pareto-dominant equilibrium with /e N θ=   as a 
benchmark to assess the effectiveness of the threat of a club-in-the-club as a reform mechanism. 
Proposition 1: Under unanimity, the weakest member of the organization can impose its 
privately optimal choice /e N θ= , thereby holding back the entire organization. 
There is in principle no reason why unanimity should favour weaker rather than stronger 
members. We have chosen our setting to capture the common view that the unanimity rule 
protects particularly weak members and slows down reforms.  
We now introduce the possibility of an inner organization by allowing a subset of members 
 to exert more effort. The n  members of the inner organization remain members of the 
initial, henceforth “outer” organization. For simplicity, we permit at most one inner organization 
that must have at least two members ( ). The latter is a natural restriction as the purpose of 
the inner organization is to provide a common good. In addition, an inner organization with n  
members imposes a negative externality on the outer organization: for all  members of the 
outer organization it reduces the utility of consuming the outer public good by 
n N<
2n ≥
N
nλ , where 0λ ≥ . 
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We can think of this as e.g. trade diversion following the introduction of the common currency. 
Each member of the inner organization enjoys additional benefits of  where  ( ) 
denotes the minimal effort exerted by any member of the inner (outer) organization. The payoff 
of type , who is a member of both the inner and the outer organization is     
[ ]In Outn e e− Ine Oute
i n∈
(4)                                               2[ ]i In Out Out i iy n e e Ne n eλ θ= − + − − / 2
The payoff of type j  who is only a member of the outer organization is 
(5)                                                     2 / 2j Out j jy Ne n eλ θ= − −
 A club-in-the-club emerges if at least two members exert more effort than all other members. 
The outer effort level is the lowest effort level chosen by any member and, in equilibrium, is 
never below the privately optimal level of the least productive type. The effort level of the inner 
club is determined by the second-lowest effort level. However, our objective here is to show how 
the threat of a club-in-the-club makes “deepening” possible in the sense that the organization-
wide effort increases. That is, we are interested in the highest effort level that is compatible with 
an outcome in which no inner organization forms. 
Given that an inner club needs at least two members, no member has an incentive to exert more 
effort than all other members. By contrast, if a single member exerts less effort, the additional 
effort of all other  members is not wasted anymore. Instead, they form an inner 
organization, thereby reducing their utility from the outer public good by 
1N −
( 1N )λ − . Thus, when 
choosing effort, each member compares the payoff from matching the common effort level 
(which involves higher disutility from effort and higher consumption) with the payoff from 
working less but incurring the deadweight loss ( 1)Nλ − . Applying this trade-off to the weakest 
type yields the maximum effort level / 2 ( 1) /CNe N Nθ λ= + − θ  that is compatible with all 
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members choosing the same effort. Henceforth, we refer to this level as the coercion effort level.  
Proposition 2: The threat of an inner organization can coerce weaker members to exert more 
effort, thereby increasing the organization’s maximum effort level to 
/ 2 ( 1) /CNe N Nθ λ θ= + − . 
The possibility of an inner organization can make reform feasible; weaker members exert more 
effort in order to avoid the execution of the threat. Hence, unanimity need not confine an 
organization to the pace preferred by its weakest member. 
We now consider the effect of “widening”, i.e., a new member joining the club. Our interest 
concerns the relationship between the widening of the Union and its deepening, which amounts in 
our model to the impact that the new member has on the coercion effort level. 
Suppose first that the newly admitted member θnew is more productive than the organization’s 
least productive type θ . In this case, the coercion effort level unambiguously increases: The 
higher consumption benefits of an enlarged club provide the weakest type with stronger 
incentives to exert effort. In addition, exerting less effort than all other  members of the 
enlarged club entails a larger externality 
N
Nλ . Consequently, the threat of an inner organization 
becomes more effective, thereby eliciting even more effort from the least productive type. 
When the new member is less productive than the (previously) weakest type θ , the new type θnew 
is decisive for the coercion effort level. Parallel to the reasoning of Proposition 2, the coercion 
effort level in the enlarged club with N+1 members is 1( ) ( 1) / 2 /
C
N new new nee N N wθ θ λ θ+ = + + .  
Proposition 3: Deepening and widening are complements, that is, )()(1 θθ CNnewCN ee ≥+ , if and 
only if the new member is sufficiently advanced, newθ θ< % , where 
( 1) / / ( 1N N N Nθ θ θ+ < < −% ) . 
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Proof: The coercion effort level  monotonically decreases in 1(
C
N newe θ+ ) newθ . By direct 
substitution one can show that 1( ( 1) /e N ) ( )
C C
N NN eθ θ+ + >  and 1( /( 1))C CN N ( )e N N eθ θ+ − < , which 
proves the proposition. 
When the new member has high effort cost ( 1) /new Nθ θ> + N , there are two opposing effects. 
As above, a larger club makes the threat of an inner organization stronger, increasing the coercion 
effort level. However, the privately optimal effort choice of the new member newNe θ/)1( +=  is 
lower than that of the previously least productive type θ . This, in turn, implies that the new 
weakest type is also more reluctant to exert high effort. Intuitively, this latter effect is dominated 
by the effect of a stronger club-in-the-club threat if the new type is not too unproductive, i.e., 
[ ( 1) / , ]new N Nθ θ∈ + %θ . That is, even though such a type is weaker than all current members, it 
would, if admitted, contribute to the deepening of the organization in the sense of increasing the 
coercion effort level. For all weaker types θθ ~>new , the increase in the threat of an inner 
organization does not suffice to compensate the higher effort cost, and widening reduces the 
scope for deepening. Finally, the two effects go in the same direction when the previously 
weakest type θ  is only slightly stronger than the new type , ( 1) / Nnew Nθ θ θ⎡ ⎤+∈⎣ ⎦ . Accordingly, 
widening increases both the privately optimal effort choice of the weakest type and the coercion 
effort, as in the case when the new member is more productive than type θ .  
 
II.  The Evolution of the European Union and the Threat of an Inner Club 
In the Treaty of Rome 1957 the Benelux countries, France, Germany and Italy created the 
European Economic Community (EEC) through which they committed themselves to promoting 
trade and exchange in an “ever closer Union”. They also called upon the other peoples of Europe 
 7
sharing their ideals to join, opening hereby for new members, provided they would satisfy certain 
criteria. To reassure national electorates, most important decisions would be taken by unanimity 
in the Council, the main decision-making body representing all national governments. The Union 
has subsequently been enlarged in five rounds, and the Treaty of Rome revised many times.  
The Maastricht Treaty 1993 and the subsequent formation of the European Monetary Union 
(EMU) is probably the most fitting illustration of our model. The successive accessions of United 
Kingdom, Ireland, Denmark, Greece, Portugal and Spain, completed in 1986, had significantly 
increased the Union’s heterogeneity in terms of the desire for deeper integration and costs of 
reform. During the second half of the 1980s, EC Commission President Jacques Delors and the 
stronger members had pushed for further integration, often under a thinly veiled threat to form an 
inner core. The Treaty of Maastricht made this threat explicit with the creation of the European 
Monetary Union. The treaty specified strict criteria for joining this club-in-the-club, requiring 
reform efforts particularly painful for countries with large budgetary problems, such as Greece or 
Italy. The formation of a monetary union and the creation of a joint currency had many benefits 
that would only accrue to participating members; the deadweight loss from trade diversion would 
however be carried by all club members. Few observers anticipated at the time that all countries 
eventually would be able to meet the criteria. The EMU process led to a revitalization of the 
European integration process and a phase of growth.  
The Treaty of Amsterdam 1999: Eastern Enlargement was more or less certain to happen and 
some member states were threatening to proceed beyond macroeconomic coordination,2 when 
                                                 
2 For example, the French president President Jacques Chirac and the German Foreign Minister 
Joschka Fischer both explicitly proposed that a subset of EU members should pursue integration 
further. 
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European leaders incorporated “closer cooperation” in individual policy areas as an institution of 
the EU. A subset of member states, at least eight, could proceed with deeper integration provided 
that the European Council authorized such closer cooperation with qualified majority.3 
Furthermore, the Amsterdam Treaty extended qualified majority voting to a few additional areas. 
The Reform Treaty 2007, yet to be ratified by member states, is the result of a drawn-out 
process to address the institutional challenges posed by the Eastern Enlargement. The Treaty 
incorporates most of the revisions from the Nice Treaty of 2003 and important elements of the 
rejected Constitution. Under the new rules for “enhanced cooperation” in the Reform Treaty 
(“closer cooperation” in the Amsterdam Treaty) the requirement of a minimum of eight members 
remains, but after enlargement this represents less than a third, rather than more than half, of 
member states. The Reform Treaty follows the Nice Treaty in assigning more firmly the 
responsibility to coordinate enhanced cooperation to the European Commission.4  
The Reform Treaty extends qualified majority voting to 20 new policy areas, such as energy 
policy and humanitarian aid, leaving only key areas to be decided unanimously (including tax, 
social policy, defence, foreign policy, and treaty revisions). The Reform Treaty also redefines 
qualified majority voting into double majority voting, requiring a minimum of 55 per cent of 
Member States representing a minimum of 65 per cent of the EU's population to pass legislation. 
Thus, the European Union responded to increasing heterogeneity by weakening the veto rights of 
individual Member States and more recently by lowering the bar for passage in the European 
Council. The hope is that these changes will help maintaining the reform pressure.  
 
                                                 
3 In other words both a majority of member states and qualified majority of votes were necessary.   
4 Part III, Title VI, Chapter III, Article III-322-329 in the Reform Treaty. 
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III.  Majority Voting and the “Club-in-the-Club” Threat 
Our theory argues that the threat of forming a club-in-the-club can be a powerful instrument to 
make weak members work harder for common goals. To date, the EU has remained a club of 
states with equal membership rights; the threat has not yet been executed. Rather, the Union 
increasingly uses or intends to use qualified majority voting, an instrument offering a substitute 
mechanism for making less committed member states increase their efforts. Where a qualified 
majority governs a policy area, the EU-wide contributions for public goods are higher than the 
ones the weakest member would force upon the others by using their veto power. Qualified 
majority voting thus takes away power from individual member states. Consistent with our 
theory, the policy areas in which enhanced cooperation is allowed largely overlap with those 
where qualified majority voting applies, suggesting that indeed they are substitutes. 
In the simple model brought forward in this paper, a move from veto to majority voting can be 
conceptualized as follows. When an entrant is weaker than the weakest of the incumbent member 
states, the weakest incumbent may prefer qualified majority (in the extreme, unanimity minus 
one) to unanimity, because otherwise effort falls too much. The club would thus prepare itself for 
the accession of weaker countries by changing the voting rights. 
In a more general setting (Berglof et al, 2006) we show that when the heterogeneity among 
members of a club increases, the threat of a club-in-the-club may be executed. This provides a 
strong rationale to engage in the costly process of transforming the voting rights to qualified 
majority. When members of a club ex ante do not know precisely what their relative position with 
respect to some policy areas will be, they may indeed agree to give up their right to veto ex ante 
to avoid the formation of an inner club ex post. 
This leads us to the crucial question whether the threat of forming a club-in-the-club will 
ultimately be executed and what the consequences would be. Notice that a member state not 
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ratifying the Reform Treaty (and before that the failed Constitution) faces the prospect of not 
participating in the integration process laid out in the document. Presumably it would instead 
have to join some looser, yet to be defined, organization, possibly akin to the European Economic 
Area. EEA member states are essentially subject to the same rules as EU members but without 
the right to participate in the process through which these rules are adopted. Such exclusion could 
be very costly, particularly if a country found itself alone. However, there would also be costs for 
the Union from having an important country, say the United Kingdom, excluded in this way.  
There is yet another consequence of a club-in-the-club actually materializing. Consider the EMU, 
potentially a first inner club for countries wanting not only monetary integration, but also 
integration of financial regulation and supervision. Non-members have been keen to ensure that 
the option of EMU as an inner club is not pursued. In particular, for new EU members who seem 
unlikely to meet the Maastricht criteria in the near future, the EMU increasingly appears as a 
club-in-the-club potentially diverting trade and investments from them. As a result such a club-
in-the-club would also decrease the value of acceding to the Union. Berglof and Roland (1997) 
have argued that membership in the EU provided applicant transition countries with a powerful 
outside “anchor” when bringing about institutional changes. Burkart and Wallner (2000) have 
provided a formal theory of this effect, still clearly visible particularly in the countries of 
Southeastern Europe. Such a weakening of the “soft powers” of the Union from a club-in-the-
club actually forming is an additional risk that needs to be considered when revising the treaties. 
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